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 Summary 
Since the end of the Second World War the majority of armed conflicts has no longer been 
fought between states but takes place within the territory of a single state. At least one 
non-state armed group (NSAG) is involved. In such conflicts NSAGs challenge state- and 
peace-building processes with violent or criminal acts. Furthermore, by directly affecting 
peoples’ physical security and by undermining state authority they also pose a dangerous 
threat to human security. The daily life of many civilians is severely endangered by their 
existence.  
One violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which is committed by non-
state armed groups is the use of anti-personnel mines (AP mines or APMs). APMs are 
indiscriminate and inhumane weapons. They still maim and kill ordinary people every 
day: Hardly any other weapon claims so many human lives. Consequently, in 1997 the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was adopted. The so-called Ottawa-Treaty 
completely bans all anti-personnel mines. Despite this, the goal of a world free of mines is 
still not realized. While it is true that the number of states using APMs has decreased in 
the last decade, APMs are, nonetheless, far more frequently deployed by non-state actors. 
Armed groups often have fewer military resources than states, and are therefore more 
likely to resort to the use of landmines.  
In spite of its significance, the Ottawa Treaty provides no opportunity for NSAGs to 
express their willingness to abide by its norms. However, the findings above demonstrate 
that global norms such as the ban of anti-personnel mines, must also apply for NSAGs in 
order to achieve a mine-free world. Besides, empirical evidence shows that it is quite 
possible to bind non-state actors to humanitarian norms. One pioneering initiative in 
engaging NSAGs is Geneva Call, an NGO based in Geneva, Switzerland. Since 2000, the 
organization is dedicated to engage armed non-state actors towards compliance with the 
norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law, starting with a total ban 
on anti-personnel mines. The engagement of the NGOs began with the development of a 
Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for 
Cooperation in Mine Action (referred to below as the Deed of Commitment, DoC). 
Through signing the Deed of Commitment armed groups commit themselves to stop the 
use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines. In addition a ban on AP 
mines and the general idea of humanitarian norms, the Deed of Commitment also 
specifies implementation and monitoring mechanisms. In this way, Geneva Call involves 
NSAGs directly in obligations to observe humanitarian norms.  
Negotiations between Geneva Call and armed groups are often meetings of a special 
kind: Most recently, in June 2009 representatives of 28 NSAGs met in Geneva and 
discussed possibilities for binding armed groups to IHL. Since its launch, Geneva Call has 
engaged in dialogue with more than 60 NSAGs worldwide. Of these, so far 41 groups from 
Asia, Europe and Africa have signed the Deed of Commitment. Geneva Call's engagement 
is outstanding in two ways: On the one hand, the NGO functions as a norm entrepreneur 
vis-à-vis non-state armed actors and not (like other NGOs) vis-à-vis states or 
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corporations. On the other hand, with the DoC Geneva Call has established an innovative 
mechanism, with which NSAGs can commit themselves to humanitarian law and for the 
first time become signatories to an internationally respected treaty.  
The very notion of an adherence to the mine ban norm by NSAGs seems at first glance 
to contradict the conventional assumption that NSAGs have in principle only limited 
interest in accepting norms, because they do not regard themselves as bound by 
international treaties. However, latest the success of Geneva Call shows that non-state 
armed groups can no longer be regarded only as a challenger to peace governance. By 
signing the Deed of Commitment, NSAGs are achieving a new position in a global 
normative order. 
Because successful integration of NSAGs requires comprehensive understanding of 
these groups, the present report asks how a norm acceptance by NSAGs can be explained. 
If we learn more about the conditions under which integration of these actors proceeds 
successfully, recommendations for practice can also be worked out. Thus, the goal was to 
investigate why NSAGs voluntarily commit themselves to humanitarian norms. For this 
purpose, with the help of process-analytic procedures the norm acceptance of one NSAG 
– the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – was investigated. As one of 
the first NSAGs to do so, the SPLM/A signed the Deed of Commitment in 2001, although 
at that time it was still engaged in conflict with the government. The analysis showed that 
a number of factors played a role in their acceptance of the norm. On the one hand, 
transnational pressure influenced the decision of the SPLM/A to sign the DoC. 
Transnational strategies of shaming them had an influence on this NSAG, particularly 
because they had a strong need for legitimacy and consequently feared a loss of 
reputation. The analysis also showed that a “shadow of future statehood” not only 
increases an NSAG’s need for legitimacy but also raises their awareness about the material 
costs a later assumption of power would entail. Their concern that they would not be able 
to carry out the rebuilding of their country on their own contributed decisively to the 
norm acceptance by the SPLM/A. In the case investigated in this report, finally, 
humanitarian issues also played a role in the signing of the Deed of Commitment. Within 
the NSAG, it was primarily the function of two former SPLM/A commanders which was 
decisive. These two played the role of norm entrepreneurs within the movement, and 
directed the attention of the SPLM/A leadership to negative consequences of the use of 
landmines. Consequently, no single explanatory factor can be identified for the norm 
acceptance by the SPLM/A. Instead, the signing of the Deed of Commitment can be 
attributed to a combination of factors, each of which accounts for the decision to accept 
the norm.  
The results obtained make it possible to draw a few conclusions on possible starting 
points for the international community for possible engagement strategies with non-state 
armed groups. On the one hand, it seems promising to change the cost-benefit calculation 
of the norm-violating NSAG in such a way that the costs of norm violation exceed its 
benefits. This is possible by denouncing an NSAG so that it is concerned about its 
reputation; but may also be possible if external actors threaten to withdraw their 
(financial) support in the event of a further norm violation. The offer to support an NSAG 
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in clearing mines in the area they control can decisively influence its renunciation of AP 
mines. On the other hand, the example of the SPLM/A shows, that an NSAG can also be 
convinced of the appropriateness of a norm through dialog.  
The finding also suggests that governance initiatives beyond a state-centered, 
hierarchical and repressive mode of governance are more effective in dealing with non-
state armed actors: For NGOs questions of state sovereignty and non-interference are not as 
decisive as these are to states. A possibility for state actors thus offers itself through the 
employment of NGOs for including non-state armed groups in a political order. 
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In the end, the choice for or against  
a ban on landmines  
is a choice for cosmopolitan humanism  
against nationalist self-interest. 
 
Jef Van Gerwen  
 
May armed groups then make the ethical choice. 
 
Soliman Santos 
 
1. Introduction1 
During the last decade, non-state armed groups (NSAGs),2 which play a major role in the 
majority of armed conflicts worldwide, have received increasing attention from the 
international community. Whereas many studies have focused only on the role of NSAGs 
in conflict management and resolution (Conciliation Resources 2004), the present report 
asks how the peace-endangering potential of non-state armed groups can effectively be 
contained. For this purpose, it focuses on the example of a violation of international 
humanitarian law which nowadays is committed mainly by NSAGs: the use of anti-
personnel mines. Branded a “deadly plague,” the “scourge of humanity,” or “weapons of 
mass destruction in slow motion”, APMs constitute the cruelest and most insidious 
weapon of our age. Hardly any other weapon claims so many human victims. Every day 
mines kill and injure mainly civilians; every fifth victim is a child. APMs are so dangerous 
because they know nothing about peace. Even decades after the end of a conflict, the 
civilian population is threatened by previously laid mines. They inhibit the economic 
development of a country in the long term and destroy its infrastructure. Farming areas 
where mines are suspected lie fallow; mined roads and streets cut off whole regions from 
the external world. The consequences of mines are drastic.  
For this reason, in 1997 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known as the 
Ottawa Treaty, was adopted. Until now the treaty has been ratified by 156 states. Despite 
 
1 The empirical analysis in this report is based mainly on interviews which I carried out in the framework of 
my master’s thesis. First of all I want to thank the PRIF staff for supporting my project. Special thanks also 
go to Pascal Bongard who provided me with much-needed information and to Julian Schäfer for daily 
consultations on practical and theoretical problems during the research process.  
2 In the following sections an NSAG is understood to be “any armed actor operating outside state control 
that uses force to achieve its political/quasi-political objectives” (Geneva Call 2008). It is true that many 
authors call for a broad definition of NSAGs which considers armed non-state actor to be any group 
challenging state power and the state’s monopoly on the use of force (see Policzer 2005: 8). However, such 
a broad definition is not helpful for the present analysis since the great variation among groups only makes 
finding an explanation for possible acceptance of norms more difficult (see Florquin/Decrey Warner 2008: 
17). 
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this, the goal of a mine-free world is far from being achieved even 13 years after its 
adoption. While it is true that the number of states using AP mines has decreased in the 
last decade, APMs are, nonetheless, far more frequently deployed by non-state actors.  
Anti-personnel mines have become the weapons of choice for many parties in internal 
conflict, as they are cheap, easy to lay, and highly effective in killing and maiming human 
beings (ICRC 2007: 9). Since armed groups usually have fewer military resources than 
states, it is more likely that they will have to resort to the use of AP mines. The result of 
this is that the number of non-state users is many times higher than that of state users. 
NSAGs thus constitute the “main users of the poor man’s weapon” (Sjöberg 2006). As a 
result, it is obvious that global norms such as the banning of mines will have to involve 
NSAGs in order to achieve a mine-free world (Policzer 2005: 9). Despite this, in the last 10 
years 41 NSAGs have signed a voluntary declaration through which they commit 
themselves to stop the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of anti-personnel mines. 
This Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for 
Cooperation in Mine Action (referred to in the following as Deed of Commitment or DoC) 
was developed in 2000 by the Swiss NGO Geneva Call. This NGO has the goal of 
incorporating non-state armed groups directly into a ban on anti-personnel mines. Its 
guiding principle is: If NSAGs are part of the problem; they need to be part of the solution too.  
The renunciation of mines by non-state armed groups is surprising from several points 
of view. On the one hand, anti-personnel mines often have important strategic 
significance for NSAGs, so that dispensing with their use would have to be connected with 
high costs. On the other hand, acceptance of the norm seems to contradict the 
conventional assumption that in principle NSAGs have only limited interest in accepting 
norms because they do not regard themselves as bound by international norms.3 In 
addition, at the latest since the attacks of 9/11 NSAGs are as a rule perceived as the “bad 
guys” of world politics, and not infrequently are linked with transnational terrorist groups. 
Possible engagement with them is then strictly rejected with the comment that 
recognizing them as negotiating partners would lend them legitimacy.  
How important it is to bind NSAGs to international humanitarian law has, however, 
been recognized in recent years. For instance, as early as 2004 Kofi Annan emphasized 
that the establishment of international standards among NSAGs would have to be given 
the highest priority (UN 2004), and Ban Ki-Moon too pronounced: “The United Nations 
must be able to talk to all warring parties, including armed groups. Failure to do so is 
always likely to mean more, not fewer, civilians killed and wounded. I urge member States 
to accept this necessity” (UN 2009). Indeed, the engagement of Geneva Call shows that 
the inclusion of non-state armed groups by means of dialogue and mechanisms of 
persuasion is an alternative to demonizing these actors (Geneva Call 2007b: 32).  
 
3 The ICRC for instance draws attention to the fact that in many cases non-state armed groups deny the 
validity of humanitarian law with the justification that these are created by states and thus have no 
application to non-state actors (ICRC 2007: 47). “Members of armed groups party to non-international 
armed conflicts have little incentive to adhere to IHL [International Humanitarian Law] given the fact that 
they are likely eventually to face domestic criminal prosecution and serious penalties for having taken part 
in the conflict even if they comply with IHL” (ICRC 2007: 61). Regarding this ambivalence see also Krieger (2009). 
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The role of non-state armed groups is much more ambivalent than it seems at first 
glance. On the one hand, through the use of (military) force NSAGs attack the core 
function of the state, namely establishment of security, and in many cases hamper 
processes of state- and peace-building. On the other hand, NSAGs are genuinely in a 
position to provide protection and safety to civilians in regions in which the state 
monopoly on the use of force is only weakly established (Chojnacki/Herchenbach 2007). 
Under which conditions an NSAG functions more as a spoiler or as a governance actor is 
still unclear (Schneckener 2009). Consequently, the present report focuses on the question 
of how acceptance of the norm by non-state armed groups can be explained. Geneva Call 
emphasizes: “In view of Geneva Call’s experience, understanding the concerns and 
motives articulated by NSAs [non-state actors] is fundamental” (Geneva Call 2007a: 31). 
The causes of the norm acceptance are investigated in a concrete case: the signing of the 
Deed of Commitment by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The 
SPLM/A, founded in 1983 to fight against the structural differences between the north and the 
south of Sudan, signed the Deed of Commitment as one of the first NSAGs in 2001 and, since 
the signing of the peace treaty of 2005, has been part of a joint government of national unity.  
For the following analysis of the renunciation of landmines, in Chapter 2 the 
integration of non-state armed groups in a mine ban will be examined initially in general 
terms, and potential explanatory factors for the norm acceptance identified. After this, 
background information on the civil war in Sudan and the NSAG which was investigated 
will be presented. Chapter 4 describes the phenomenon which is to be explained, the 
norm acceptance by the SPLM/A. Subsequently, in chapter 5 the tenability of reasons 
which may account for the signing of the DoC are tested. Chapter 6 brings the results 
together and indicates starting points for the international community for interacting with 
NSAGs. In chapter 7 a conclusion is drawn.  
2. The integration of non-state armed groups into a mine ban 
2.1 Non-state armed groups - bound by international regulation? 
With the Ottawa Treaty an agreement in international law which declares the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines illegal has already existed 
since 1997. The so-called “Ottawa Process” created a new humanitarian norm which is 
also largely observed by those states who have not yet become parties to the convention 
(such as the U.S.). However, the convention has also drawn particular attention because of 
the way it came into existence: Civil society groups played a decisive role in furthering the 
ban on mines. In no other area of arms control have NGOs and their global network, the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),4 had influence of such magnitude as 
was the case during the negotiations in Ottawa.  
 
4 At present, the ICBL unites more than 1,400 organizations in 90 different countries.  
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However, whereas states can express their adherence to a ban on mines by signing and 
ratifying the Ottawa Treaty, for a long time NSAGs only had the possibility of openly 
committing themselves to a ban on anti-personnel mines by publishing a unilateral 
declaration of intention or by incorporating it into their own codes of conduct. It is true 
that since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions NSAGs have been committed to 
international humanitarian law to a limited extent.5 In comparison with agreements 
affecting conflicts between states, however, international humanitarian law for non-
international conflicts continue to be rudimentary. In addition, they are frequently only 
aimed at obtaining agreement from state actors, and regard acceptance by NSAGs as 
irrelevant. “Hence, even serious acts of violence committed by non-state groups could not, 
by definition, be treated with the same body of instruments” (Policzer 2005: 8). This 
grievance can primarily be attributed to the fact that state actors often shy away from 
engaging NSAGs. They fear that even a partial status for NSAGs as legal subjects in 
relation to international humanitarian law could be the first step in an undesirable 
legitimation process (Krieger 2009: 13).6 The international community is therefore 
confronted with an engagement dilemma (Dudouet 2009: 8). 
Consequently, NSAGs are mostly perceived as outlaws and rule-breakers. However, by 
regarding them as such states fail to recognize reality. That non-state armed actors are perfectly 
capable of being bound by humanitarian norms is shown by the work of Geneva Call. The 
Geneva-based NGO is playing a pioneer role in promoting the humanitarian responsibility of 
non-state armed groups. In doing this, Geneva Call functions as a norm entrepreneur vis-à-vis 
non-state armed actors and not (like other NGOs) only vis-à-vis states or corporations. Over 
and above that, with the Deed of Commitment the Geneva NGO has made an innovative 
mechanism available, with the help of which NSAGs can bind themselves to international law 
and become signatories to an internationally recognized body of rules.7  
The DoC has four key elements: in addition to a) the adherence of humanitarian 
principles and b) the assistance for the implementation of the norms, it also involves c) 
accountability in the event of norm violation8 and d) participation in the norm generating 
 
5 See Schaller (2007) and Kretzmer (2009). A minimum standard in international humanitarian law which 
is binding for “every party involved in the conflict” (Art. 3, Par. 1) in non-international conflicts contains 
for instance the common article 3, which is to be found in identical form in all four conventions. The 
Supplementary Protocol II from 1977 extends the guarantee of basic rights of respect for the person in 
internal armed conflicts beyond the minimal consensus of the common articles, but has only limited 
applicability (cp. also Herr 2010).  
6 A subject of international law is the bearer of rights and duties whose behavior is directly governed by 
international humanitarian law. States are primarily regarded as the undisputed subjects of international 
law. Many states fear that assigning an identity in international law would afford non-state armed groups 
the same treatment as states, and as a result reject assigning such an identity.  
7 Since 2009 a “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines,” which 
was developed by the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, exists alongside the Deed of Commitment. 
However, this initiative is restricted to a particular region and has only been signed by three NSAGs up 
until now (Landmine Monitor 2009: 8).  
8 It is true that a violation of the norm is not subject to direct sanctions. Still, in the event of a norm 
violation, naming and shaming strategies are carried out by Geneva Call and threaten the NSAG, as these 
strategies could lead to loss of reputation (Grävingholt et al. 2007: 32). 
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processes. In addition to the acceptance of the ban on AP mines and to the general idea of 
humanitarian norms, the Deed of Commitment thus also specifies measures for 
implementation as well as mechanisms with whose help NSAGs can be made accountable 
for their behavior. By signing the DoC they thus commit themselves not only to reporting 
regularly on measures for implementing it, but also to allowing verification commissions 
in the field (Santos 2003). The Deed of Commitment actually includes stricter monitoring 
and verification mechanisms than the Ottawa Treaty (see Findlay 1999: 45).9 The DoC 
thus provides the basis “on which legal representations can be made and on which 
accountability can be required” (ICRC 2007: 50).  
The work of Geneva Call has been praised on multiple occasions. It was recognized as "one 
of the most innovative forms of persuading armed groups to make unilateral declarations to 
abide by IHL norms" (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2007: 27), and Ban Ki Moon 
called the Deed of Commitment a "successful example" of special agreements with non-state 
actors (UN 2009). Geneva Call’s engagement thus shows that NSAGs can no longer only be 
regarded as disquieters, to whom one can only respond with force rather than dialogue. By 
voluntarily committing themselves to humanitarian norms, NSAGs demonstrate that they can 
also serve as governance actors who support the normative order of transnational relations 
and contribute to the solution of transnational problems (Schneckener 2009). The assumption 
that governance initiatives beyond a state-centered, hierarchical and repressive mode of 
governance are more effective in dealing with non-state armed actors is not far-fetched. For 
NGOs, questions of state sovereignty and non-interference do not arise to the same extent as 
for states. It is thus easier for them to accept NSAGs as negotiating partners and bind them to 
international humanitarian law by means of dialogue and persuasion. 
2.2 Geneva Call’s (success) story 
Since its launch in 2000, Geneva Call has made great progress in its efforts to bind non-
state armed groups to international humanitarian law, with regard to both, the acceptance 
of the mine ban as well as to its implementation (Santos 2003: 10ff.). In the last ten years 
Geneva Call has carried on a dialog with more than 60 NSAGs. Up until now 41 groups 
from Africa (from Burundi, Somalia, Sudan and West-Sahara), Asia (from Myanmar, 
India and the Philippines), Europe (from Turkey) and the Middle East (from Iran and 
Iraq) have signed the Deed of Commitment. Eight others have committed themselves in 
unilateral declarations to limiting their use of anti-personnel mines. The renunciation of 
mines by these NSAGs is especially relevant because many of these groups previously both 
deployed and also themselves manufactured AP mines (Geneva Call 2007: 2).  
 
9 Geneva Call has a three-level verification system: In the event of allegations by third parties, the source of 
the accusation is identified and more details about the alleged mine use collected. If the accusation is 
detailed and based on facts, in the second step Geneva Call confronts the NSAG in question and asks it as 
well as independent third parties for a statement. If at the end of this process the accusation continues to 
be supported, a verification mission is carried out on the spot (Article 3 of the DoC). By contrast, the 
Ottawa Treaty does not once mention the word “verification,” nor does it contain any article dealing 
specifically with mechanisms with whose help states can be made accountable. Moreover, Geneva Call has 
already carried out three verification missions in its history, whereas up until now not a single such 
mission has taken place within the framework of the Ottawa Treaty (Interview #1).  
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According to Landmine Monitor these groups have not only verbally renounced mines, but 
they have also actually made no use of them. Whereas in 2000 NSAGs were still using APMs 
in 18 countries, the number of countries declined to seven in 2009 (Landmine Monitor 2009: 
8). Among those NSAGs which signed the Deed of Commitment, Geneva Call even speaks of 
“overall compliance” (Geneva Call 2007: 2). In fact, since 2000 there have only been two cases 
of accusations from the government that an NSAG has continued to use mines after signing 
the DoC: in the Philippines against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and in Somalia 
against the Puntland State of Somalia.10 In both cases Geneva Call responded by conducting 
verification missions: in 2002 and 2009 to the Philippines and in 2007 to Somalia. In this way 
the accusations of a norm violation could be shown to be baseless (Interview #1).11  
In accordance with Article 2 of the DoC, most NSAGs have also committed themselves 
to humanitarian mine action which include stockpile destruction, mine clearance, mine 
awareness and victim assistance, such as socio-economic and psychological rehabilitation of 
victims and their families. In addition, a positive multiplier effect of the acceptance of norms 
by NSAGs was observed. The best example of this is the signing of the DoC by 15 Somali 
armed groups which, at a conference on national reconciliation in 2002, agreed on the 
necessity of a ban on mines (Santos 2003: 9). A remarkable example of further dissemination 
of the norm by NSAGs is a letter with which a Sudanese NSAG, the SPLM/A, called on the 
Columbian National Liberation Army (ELN) to accept the ban on anti-personnel mines.12 
Furthermore, in June 2009 44 delegates from 29 NSAGS, all signatories to the Deed of 
Commitment, met to discuss expansion of their compliance with international norms 
related to protection of children and women in armed conflict. The initiative of Geneva Call 
thus demonstrates the great potential of NGOs to exert influence on non-state armed groups 
and integrate these into international humanitarian law. The case studied here is thus only 
one of many successful cases of acceptance of norms by NSAGS.  
2.3 Possible reasons for the norm acceptance by NSAGs  
Although non-state actors are attracting the attention of scholars more and more, 
comprehensive explanations of NSAG and their behavior are still missing. Primarily, ad-hoc 
assumptions are used for explaining the acceptance of norms by armed groups. In order to 
be able to explain the behavior of NSAGS, a short look into the theory will show whether 
potential causes of norm acceptance can be identified there.13 The search for theoretically 
 
10 In the case of the SPLM/A in the Sudan it is true that accusations by the government were reported, but 
Geneva Call decided at this time that these were unjustified and consequently carried out no verification 
mission (Interview #1). 
11 In Somalia the accusations against the local NSAG could not be confirmed. In the case of the mission 
carried out in the Philippines in 2002, the investigation revealed that a norm violation by the MILF had 
occurred but that this was the result of lack of clarity concerning the extent of the ban on mines, which 
was cleared up in talks (Geneva Call 2007: 20). The repeated accusation in 2009 could not be 
unequivocally attributed to the MILF (Geneva Call 2007: 20).  
12 See http://genevacall.org/resources/nsas-statements/f-nsas-statements/2001-2010/2004-01jun-splma.pdf.  
13 Despite the growing importance of non-state armed groups theoretically grounded analyses of NSAGs as 
norm addressee are still missing (see Capie 2008). State-centered norm theories can however deliver initial 
insight into possible reasons why NSAGs are accepting norms. The transferability of norm theories 
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well-grounded explanatory factors also makes sense because these indicate possible 
starting points for the international community to work with NSAGs.  
At first glance it seems most likely that NSAGs would make their ban of AP mines 
conditional upon their (non-existent) strategic value – especially if NSAGs are regarded as the 
bad guys, who are questioning the legitimacy of a state through the use of force. According to 
this approach, NSAGs would only do without anti-personnel mines if these had no or only 
limited military value for them, so that accepting the norm would be linked with only limited 
costs (Price 1998: 614).14 This assumption will be examined in the following chapters. 
However, other possible causes for acceptance of the norm by NSAGs can also be identified.  
It also seems likely that NSAGs would accept a norm if financial and/or material resources 
depended on it. If supporters have accepted the norm, a NSAG has to reckon with withdrawal 
of this support in case of norm violation (Bruderlein 2000: 12). Such financial and/or 
dependency can exist on the population of the territory they control, but also on foreign 
sponsors such as the diaspora or supporting neighboring states. Thus it can be assumed that a 
norm acceptance is more likely if an NSAG is material vulnerable from internal or external 
actors (cp. Risse et al. 2000).  
However, the belief in the legitimacy of a norm can also play a decisive role in the 
acceptance of the norm (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 900). The underlying assumption is: If an 
NSAG has a certain self-image, including the values associated with it, a norm will be accepted 
if it serves to maintain this self-image. Following this line of reasoning, the actors are primarily 
intrinsically motivated. They behave without external incentives on the basis of their belief in a 
norm (Capie 2008: 88). The notion that non-state armed groups can behave on the basis of 
moral conviction seems to be far-fetched for many people at first. But why should personal 
beliefs play a role with states but not with NSAGs? The ontological differentiation between 
NSAGs and states exists primarily in theory. Whereas in many parts of the world recognized 
states are not in a position to make basic public goods such as security available to the 
population, in more and more regions NSAGs are assuming the functions of the state. Where 
an NSAG sees itself as a humanitarian actor which is fighting for the interests of the 
population, it is perfectly possible it can be convinced (for instance through new information) 
of the intrinsic quality of a norm, and as a result accepts the norm.  
A well known model of norm diffusion, the spiral model developed by Risse et al., also 
draws attention to the fact that a norm will be accepted by a norm-violating actor when 
the actor is subjected to pressure by transnational (human rights) networks. Many authors 
doubt that the strategy of shaming has an effect on armed groups, paramilitaries or 
warlords (see Börzel/Risse 2009: 7; Jo 2009). However, denial of legitimacy, which in the 
case of states is evidenced through for instance being written off as “rogue states”, also has 
certain costs for NSAGs such as loss of trust, reduced credibility and loss of reputation. 
 
appears to be promising especially because it is often not possible to maintain a distinction between state 
and non-state actors in countries of the South (Capie 2008: 90). 
14 This assumption is consistent with a strictly rational point of view according to which a norm is accepted 
when the cost-benefit calculation of an actor changes and the benefit of accepting the norm outweighs the 
cost. 
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This is especially the case when NSAGs give themselves a genuine chance even of taking 
over control of the state. This is what Börzel and Risse call the “shadow of future 
statehood” (Börzel/Risse 2009: 10). In such cases, through violations of international law 
NSAGs run the risk of jeopardizing their support in their own society and internationally. 
Non-state armed groups can thus strongly value their reputation (Bongard 2008). Looked 
at in this way, acceptance of norms would be all the more likely the greater the internal or 
international need for legitimation of an NSAG (compare Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 895). 
According to this, various potential explanations for acceptance of the norm by non-state 
armed groups can be derived from theories of norm diffusion. These assumptions can be 
summarized in different clusters (see the inset). The extent to which these theoretical 
assumptions can explain norm acceptance by non-state armed groups will be examined in the 
following chapter using the case of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.  
 
I. Material vulnerability 
 The lower the strategic value of the use of mines to the 
NSAG, the more likely norm acceptance becomes.  
 The greater the financial dependency of an NSAG on 
internal and external actors, the more likely norm 
acceptance becomes.  
II. Normative vulnerability 
 The more an NSAG regards itself as a responsible actor, the 
more likely norm acceptance becomes.  
 The greater the internal and international legitimation need 
of an NSAG, the more likely norm acceptance becomes.  
III. External conditions 
 Transnational pressure increases the likelihood of norm 
acceptance.15 
 
15  An alternative sixth assumption which says that the psychological need of an NSAG to be part of a group 
of norm followers increases the probability of a norm acceptance (see Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 895), 895), 
did not turn out to be tenable in the case of the SPLM/A (Herr 2010).  
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3. The SPLM/A and the civil war in Sudan  
For a better understanding of the SPLM/A attention will first be turned to the movement 
itself and the civil war in Southern Sudan. The civil war in Sudan is one of the longest-
running armed conflicts of the present. From independence in 1956 until the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) in June 2005 the Sudanese population has 
known only a single decade of peace. The first civil war, waged from 1955 to 1972 between 
southern rebels known as Anyanya I and government troops, came to a provisional end in 
February 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Treaty. However, in the ensuing period there 
was no success in eliminating the inequalities between the economically and socially 
better-developed north and the civil war-ravaged south.16 After the influence of radical 
Islamic circles on the Sudanese government had once again increased at the end of the 
1970s, the government ended the self-administration of the south, introduced Islamic law 
and partitioned the south into several provinces (Mükusch 2008: 49). The failure of the 
government to keep the promise of autonomy made in 1972 and the renewed government 
policy of Arabization and Islamization incited civil war once again. The military conflicts, 
which were reinforced by ethnic and military divisions within the south, spread 
throughout the country and persisted throughout the following twelve years. They only 
came to an end in 2005 after years of peace negotiations under the leadership of the Inter-
Governmental Authority Development (IGAD) with the signing of a comprehensive peace 
treaty. 
Like its predecessor organization Anyanya I, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought from the outbreak of the second civil war against 
structural inequalities throughout Sudan. Just like the outbreak of the first civil war, the 
uprisings began at first with different armed factions which rejected the Addis Ababa 
Treaty. These demanded the conversion of Sudan into a secular, decentralized democracy 
in which Sudanese from the north and the south would have equal rights. The desire for 
self-determination thus stood at the center of the agenda, whether in the form of an 
autonomous, a federal or an independent Southern Sudan. In 1983 a former member of 
the army, John Garang, succeeded in uniting the factions in the struggle against the 
government in Khartoum – the SPML/A had been founded. Garang retained leadership as 
the sole chairperson until his death in July 2005.  
At the end of the 1980s criticism of the hierarchical leadership style of Garang grew 
louder. Discussions of his personal qualities and differing visions of the future of the south 
 
16 The war in Sudan is often presented as an ethnic-religious confrontation between the Arabic and Islamic 
dominated north on the one hand, and the extremely heterogeneous south, which is marked by 
Christianity and African animism. However, the causes of the conflict are much more complex and stretch 
back into the colonial past. The economic, political and administrative power had been concentrated in 
the north of the country since before colonial times, whereas the south, but also the western and eastern 
provinces of the country were increasingly marginalized. These social and economic inequalities between 
the regions count as one of the main causes of the conflict (Metelits 2004: 69). The lines of conflict thus 
run not only between north and south, but far more strongly between a small Arab elite in the north of the 
country and the other marginalized regions, including in addition to the south Darfur in the west and 
eastern regions of Sudan. For a more detailed discussion of the causes of the conflict see Hofheinz 2001. 
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led to the movement's splitting in 1991. Two leading figures in the organization, Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol, declared their independence from Garang. In March 1993, the 
renegade SPLM/A commanders formed the SPLM/A-United, which however, split again 
after a short time. Riek Machar then founded the South Sudan Independence 
Movement/Army (SSIM/A),17 while Lam Akol continued to oppose the SPLM/A with 
local militias. The government capitalized cleverly on the weakness of the SPLM/A by 
supporting armed groups in Sudan which opposed the SPLM/A. In the following period, 
armed conflicts between the different groups in the south increased and battle lines 
became more and more confused (Chiari 2008: 55). As a result of these developments the 
SPLM/A suffered substantial losses. Government troops succeeded in turning the tables 
and snatching away important areas from the SPLM/A. The split in the SPLM/A was thus 
regarded by many as a serious setback (Rolandsen 2005: 34).  
In the mid-1990s these developments caused political changes within the SPLM/A. 
After the defeats at the beginning of the 1990s demands for reform within the movement 
could no longer be ignored. As a reaction to the turbulences, in 1994 the leadership of the 
SPLM/A called the first National Convention, in which 517 delegates from all over Sudan 
participated, including representatives of the SPLM/A, but also members of civil society. 
They passed a number of resolutions which envisaged a radical restructuring of the 
movement, including sharing of power and the separation of military and civilian wings of 
the SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005: 167).18 The National Convention was celebrated as a 
symbol of reform and a new start. Despite all the criticism of the only fragmentary 
implementation of the resolutions the assembly had an important role. Sjöberg concluded: 
“The National Convention [...] marked the re-building of the SPLM/A and its political and 
military supremacy, which would in the end bring it as the only ANSA [armed non-state 
actor] signatory of the 2005 peace agreement” (2009: 38).  
At the end of the 1990s, shortly before the signing of the Deed of Commitment, the 
position of the SPLM/A really did improve substantially. Thanks to fresh support from 
abroad and weakened opposition at home, the SPLM/A succeeded in re-arming again, 
opening up new fronts in the east and re-occupying lost areas. In addition, the fighting 
reached the North of Sudan by entering the region of the Blue Nile. “By the end of the 
1990s the position of the SPLM/A had consolidated strategic-militarily and 
diplomatically” (Riehl 2001: 8). Because of the growing significance of oil, the Sudanese 
government could retain its military position for a time. After foreign firms were recruited 
to resume pumping oil in the mid-1990s, this became an important source of revenue for 
the government, which was used to increase military spending. However, after violence 
 
17 The factions in Sudan frequently changed their composition and their names. At last, the Nasir Faction led 
by Machar was known as Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SPDF). In total, in the south a large number of 
different armed groups, which were often equipped by the government in Khartoum to oppose the 
SPLM/A, existed (an overview of the various groups is to be found in Ronaldsen 2005: 64). Some authors 
estimate that the conflict among the various armed groups led to more victims among civilians than the 
conflict with the government (Sjöberg 2009: 11). 
18 This functional division also found expression in a renaming of the movement. Until this point the 
fighters called themselves Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); the name Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army was not adopted until after the separation into a military and a civilian wing. 
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escalated in the oil regions too, the Sudanese President Al-Bashir also had an interest in 
settling the conflicts. At this point genuine efforts by the Sudanese government and the 
SPLM/A to end the decades-long civil war in the south could be recognized. As a 
consequence, in July 2002 a first negotiations protocol was signed, which was followed by 
seven further treaties in the following years (the last in January 2005). Taken together, 
these agreements form the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which brought the long civil 
war to an end (Rolandsen 2005: 125). 
4. A mined country: the landmine problem in Southern Sudan and 
the SPLM/A’s mine policy 
Sudan is recognized as one of the most severely mine-affected areas worldwide. A third of 
the country is contaminated with mines. Even today, however, the true extent of the 
problem is difficult to estimate because of the absence of reliable data and the size of the 
country. In 1997 number of mines laid was estimated by the United Nations Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs as being 500,000 to 2 million, most of them in the south. There, 
the most important transport corridors, broad areas of the hinterland and the regions 
around cities like Yei, Juba, Torit, Kapoeta and Kaya are still mined even today. Reliable 
figures on mine victims do also not exist, since because of the absence of infrastructure 
many victims do not make it to hospital in time, and die from their injuries.  
During the civil war both government troops as well as the SPLM/A and rival NSAGs 
in the south made use of land mines. For a long time the conflict in Sudan’s south was 
regarded as a characteristically guerrilla war in which the government used mines mainly 
to secure garrison towns and other military strongholds, while the SPLM/A runs hit and 
run operations (Matthes 2007: 221). In doing this, since 1984 the SPLM/A was already 
using not only anti-vehicle mines, but also anti-personnel mines prohibited by the Deed of 
Commitment and the Ottawa Treaty (Landmine Monitor 1999).  
The SPLM/A's process of accepting a mine ban only gradually took effect starting in 
the mid-1990s. In 1996 an awareness of the negative effects of AP mines slowly increased 
within the SPLM/A (Interview #1). At a conference in Southern Sudan, in which 
important representatives of the SPLM/A, international and local NGOs as well as civil 
society groups under the leadership of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) 
participated, the first discussions of the use of anti-personnel mines and analysis of their 
strategic significance took place (Landmine Monitor 1999). The conference ended with 
the passage of a “Resolution on Problems Posed by Proliferation of Anti-Personnel Mines 
in Liberated Parts of New Sudan”, in which the SPLM/A expressed its deep concern about 
the tragic consequences of the use of APMs and the mounting concern of the populace in 
the mined areas. In addition, they committed themselves in this resolution to unilateral 
demining effort in the areas under their control and entrusted the NGO Operation Save 
Innocent Lives (OSIL) with this task “to help put an end this scourge”. According to 
Landmine Monitor the SPLM/A also declared itself ready to cease using anti-personnel 
mines “provided that there is a significant reciprocation on the side of GoS [Government 
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of Sudan]” (Landmine Monitor 1999). Even though this declaration was labeled a 
unilateral moratorium by the SPLM/A,19 it is scarcely regarded as such among experts. For 
instance, a member of Geneva Call, Pascal Bongard, concluded: “[Now] they say it was a 
moratorium. […] It was more kind of a realisation of the effects of landmines. They saw 
that it was a weapon that has indiscriminate effects, that was causing a lot of harm on the 
land and on the people” and "I did not stress enough the fact that their 1996 resolution did 
not prohibit the use of AP mines but committed the SPLM/A to a unilateral demining 
effort in the areas under its control” (Interview #1). Despite this declaration the SPLM/A 
continued to use anti-personnel mines after 1996, among other places in Eastern 
Equatoria, an SPLM/A controlled region, which was not mined until 1999. According to 
reports, the mining of the region was to prevent the population returning to the city 
(Landmine Monitor 2000).  
Nonetheless, an increasing discussion of anti-personnel mines in this period can be 
observed. Both the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government requested international 
assistance in the removal of mines. In 1997, with start-up assistance from UNICEF/OLS, 
Christian Aid, DanChurch Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
OSIL began removing mines in SPLM/A controlled regions. In addition, in the south 
public awareness trainings on the risks of APMs was carried out with the assistance of 
various humanitarian organizations. Since 1998 OSIL has also been supported by the 
British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in the training and education of OSIL 
workers (Interview #1).  
On March 24 – 25, 2001 representatives of the SPLM/A participated with other non-
state actors in a groundbreaking conference on the use of mines which was organized by 
the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with a number of other national 
campaigns in Geneva. In manifold panels they discussed the use of APMs by NSAGs and 
the legal and normative framework of a possible integration of NSAGs into international 
humanitarian law. In addition, non-state armed groups also had their say, among them 
representatives of the SPLM/A. At the close of the conference two former SPLM/A 
commanders, Aleu Ayieny Aleu and Edward Lino, who represented the SPLM/A in 
Geneva, committed themselves verbally to the Deed of Commitment (Interview #1).  
Aleu and Lino made a major contribution to raising awareness within the SPLM/A in 
dealing with anti-personnel mines (Interviews #1, #2). Aleu, who was also director of 
OSIL, emphasized in Geneva that one of the greatest challenges in his work was raising 
awareness among the SPLM/A rank and file members. According to him, the leadership 
elite has been aware of the negative consequences of mines since the end of the 1990s. 
Consequently, at the conference in Geneva the SPLM/A elite had not to be persuaded 
fundamentally. What was new for the SPLM/A was the mechanism of the Deed of 
Commitment, with the help of which they were able to convert their recognition of the 
negative effects of mines into a legal binding commitment which would attract 
international approval. The conference in Geneva also showed the SPLM/A that it is part 
 
19 See for instance the statement of Aleu Ayieny Aleus to the Pioneer Conference in March 2000 (Geneva 
Call 2001: 74). The Landmine Monitor also stated in 1999: “The SPLA considered this initiative to be pro-
ban” (Landmine Monitor 1999). 
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of a larger international movement that works for a world free of antipersonnel landmines 
(Geneva Call 2001: 89).  
Aleu and Lino also remained in contact with Geneva Call after the March 2000 
conference. Aleu for example met again with Geneva Call, the Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers and the Coalition against Torture before the signing of the DoC in July 
2001. He used this opportunity to reinforce the interest of the SPLM/A in signing the 
DoC. Finally, in September a meeting with Aleu and Lino took place at which precise 
details of the signing were discussed. At this meeting the content of the DoC and the 
necessary follow-up measures in the event of a signing were reviewed. However, Bongard 
emphasized that the precise wording of the DoC was not a matter for discussion, but were 
accepted by the SPLM/A representatives without any objections. Finally, in October 2001 
SPLM/A commander Nhial Dheng Nhial traveled to Geneva to sign the Deed of 
Commitment on behalf of the SPLM/A (Interview #1). How this norm acceptance can be 
explained is set out in the following chapter.  
5. Reasons for the Ban of Landmines by the SPLM/A 
5.1 Strategic value of anti-personnel mines 
The first point to be investigated is the assumption that NSAGs only abstain from using 
anti-personnel mines when these have no or only limited military value for them, thus 
lowering the cost of refraining from their use. The strategic value of anti-personnel mines 
depends first and foremost on the military strategy of the NSAG, the current conflict 
situation, the danger posed by mines to their own fighters and the possibility of using 
other (military) alternatives. According to a study by the ICRC, anti-personnel mines play 
an important role in guerrilla-like actions, whereas in (more) symmetrical conflicts, in 
which the parties in conflict have access to other weapons, mines have less significance 
(ICRC 1997). 
At the beginning of the war in 1983 the military strategy of the SPLM/A could 
correctly be described as that which followed conventional guerrilla tactics: SPLM/A 
fighters carried out localized hit-and-run operations and avoided direct confrontation 
with the opponent. Mines were used in such operations to fix government forces in the 
towns, to interdict their supply lines and to terrorize local populations in order to 
diminish their support for the opposite side (Interview #2). At the end of the 1990s, 
however, this tactic changed. Because of its improved financial situation the SPLM/A 
could begin to make use of armored and mechanized forces. In addition to small arms and 
light weapons, the SPLM/A soon had modest supplies of artillery, rocket launchers and 
armored vehicles (Chiari 2008: 52). At the end of the 1990s, military confrontations thus 
also involved symmetrical operations which took place on several fronts simultaneously. 
The government attempted to maintain garrison cities, but the SPLM/A succeeded more 
and more in achieving military successes. The battles reached their high point in 2001 in 
Bahr al-Ghazal (Matthes 2002: 326). 
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In addition, the SPLM/A was increasingly confronted with problems arising from the 
laying of mines in their territory. Possibilities for communication among separate units 
were limited and mined areas were not marked. Individual units thus had no information 
about mined areas and there was a danger that their own fighters would become mine 
victims (Geneva Call 2005a: 30). In the period before the signing of the DoC the 
Landmine Monitor reported a couple of times on mine victims among SPLM/A fighters 
(Landmine Monitor 1999; 2000; 2001). The negative effects of the use of mines were thus 
being felt not only by the civilian population. In addition to mine victims among their 
own soldiers, the SPLM/A also had to cope with interrupted access to infrastructure and 
restrictions in their freedom of movement. In the south of the country there were neither 
effective transportation facilities nor communication channels; the roads were mostly 
mined. As a consequence, the SPLM/A often had to deal with long detours in order to 
move around in the south (Lako 1994: 79). The laying of mines in and around agricultural 
crop-production and grazing areas disturbed the production of food markedly. In 
addition, mined roads, bridges, landing strips and rail lines brought traffic in entire 
regions to a halt, so that additional costs in the millions were caused in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid (Landmine Monitor 2001).  
The realization that anti-personnel mines had only limited military use for the 
SPLM/A but had negative effects on its own fighters clearly seems to have played a role in 
the decision to sign the Deed of Commitment. However, it cannot be concluded that anti-
personnel mines had no strategic value for them at all. Instead, it seems more likely that 
the human and socio-economic costs of the use of mines were greater than their value. 
Bongard observed:  
“They realized that many casualties were caused by their own mines. They also realized that 
this weapon was very indiscriminative, very difficult to know once it is laid who it will hit. 
There are not necessarily maps or good communications between units. So I think they 
realized that in terms of military utility this weapon was causing much more human and 
socio-economic costs and has long term consequences” (Interview #1).  
However, the decision to accept the norm does not seem to be solely attributable to the 
changed cost-benefit ratio for anti-personnel mines. When the process of norm 
acceptance is examined closely, it becomes apparent that this argument was used most of 
all by two former SPLM/A commanders, Aleu und Lino, to convince their own followers 
of the value of renouncing anti-personnel mines. Statements by the two ex-commanders 
show that both were convinced that because of the indiscriminate nature of these 
weapons the use of anti-personnel mines is inhumane (see also Chapter 5.4).20 However, 
the SPLM/A leadership emphasized again and again that they had difficulty in convincing 
people to accept the mine ban, especially at the beginning, because many commanders 
regarded mines as legitimate weapons in certain circumstances (for example, for self-
defense) and justified the use of mines through its military necessity (Geneva Call 2007b: 
20). To guarantee acceptance of the ban, in 2003 a workshop was carried out in the south 
of Sudan with the goal of increasing respect for the DoC by all SPLM/A commanders. The 
SPLM/A leadership thus had to convince their own followers. For this purpose, particular 
 
20  Thus Lino for example emphasized: “The very people we wanted to liberate [...] became the innocent 
victims including our own mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters” (Lino 2004). 
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attention was drawn to the limited military value of AP mines. For instance in the 
framework of this workshop Aleu reprimanded the SPLM/A commanders and officers 
in the room: “I do not think any one of you here can tell me of a single objective denied 
to the government forces by landmines. Not one” (Geneva Call 2003: 4). Thus, the 
reduced strategic value of mines obviously played less of a role in the decision of the 
SPLM/A leadership to sign the DoC than in convincing their own followers also to 
implement the Deed of Commitment. 
There are also other reasons why the questionable strategic value of APMs cannot 
account solely for signing the DoC. At the time of signing the document the SPLM/A was 
still involved in military actions against the government. Even though the SPLM/A had 
consolidated its military position, there continued to be an asymmetry between the parties 
to the conflict. In addition, events at the beginning of the 1990s had shown that external 
developments could substantially influence the course of the war. As a result, the SPLM/A 
could not be sure that the situation would not change again to its disadvantage. 
Furthermore, as a result of crude oil production in the south of the country the Sudanese 
government was able to increase its military expenditures (Rolandsen 2005: 125). Thus, 
the NSAG had to anticipate a renewed offensive by government troops, in which anti-
personnel mines would definitely have been helpful in limiting the mobility of the 
Sudanese military (Interview #3). Nonetheless, the SPLM/A did not question the contents 
of the DoC, but sought to introduce even stricter implementation measures (Interview 
#1). A lack of usefulness of AP mines on its own is not a sufficient explanation for this 
proactive attitude to the signing of the DoC. 
5.2 Dependence on financial/technical support 
Below, the material vulnerability of the SPLM/A will be examined in order to determine 
the extent to which concern about falling financial and/or technical support from internal 
or external sources influenced the decision to sign the Deed of Commitment.  
Although the south of Sudan is rich in natural resources, the SPLM/A was not able to 
exploit these. It was thus dependent on external support from the very beginning (Riehl 
2001: 7). Whereas at the beginning of the 1980s the neighboring country Ethiopia gave 
substantial support,21 after the fall of Mengistu the Ethiopian aid was cut off in 1991. After 
a period of financial drought, the SPLM/A was subsidized by Uganda and Kenya in the 
middle of the 1990s. Out of fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, 
both countries were in favor of the overthrow of the government in Khartoum (Rolandsen 
2005: 38). The apparent religious dimension of the conflict also led Christian 
organizations in Rwanda and the U.S. to provide financial support for the SPLM/A. The 
 
21  The President of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam, supported the SPLM/A from its being founded in 
1983. Refugee camps in the Ethiopian border region served as logistic and economic centers for the 
SPLM/A; they helped with recruiting and aid could be systematically diverted from them (Sjöberg 2009: 42).  
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U.S even provided so-called “non-lethal” military support to the Southern movement 
during that time.22  
In addition to support from neighboring countries the misuse, redistribution, and 
taxation of international aid deliveries also constituted an important source of income for 
the SPLM/A. Roland stated: “Which was more important – the supplies rebel factions 
received from sympathetic countries or captured in battle, or the food and resources 
diverted from the relief operations or mobilised from the local population – is still 
difficult to establish” (2005: 48). Thus, it is true that the SPLM/A was materially 
dependent on internal and external supporters in the middle of the 1990s. However, this 
financial and technical dependency of the SPLM/A decreased during the conflict. The 
competition for resources among the various armed groups in the south came to an end in 
1997 with the signing of an peace treaty between Riek Machar and the government in 
Khartoum. The SPLM/A had now established itself as the most important group in the 
south. In addition, the relationship of the SPLM/A to the U.S. and Europe improved 
substantially at the end of 1997, because it succeeded in using Al-Bashir’s call for a jihad to 
depict the war as a religious conflict and thus to win the sympathy of the Western world. It 
can therefore be assumed that at this time the SPLM/A had no need to fear losing support. 
Instead, the SPLM/A was rebuilding its military and political supremacy and consolidated 
its position as the major NSAG in the South (Rolandsen 2005: 52). As the material 
vulnerability of the SPLM/A was decreasing at the end of the 1990s, it is unlikely that it 
had an influence on the SPLM/A's acceptance of the norm.  
5.3 Belief in the legitimacy of the norm 
The third thesis speculates that the SPLM/A accepted the norm because this is consistent 
with their own self-image as humanitarian actors. Behind it lies the assumption that 
NSAGs reject the use of mines when they see themselves as humanitarian actors who fight 
for the needs of their people. When they realize, that AP mines are indiscriminative 
weapons, that maim and kill also civilians, they can accept a mine ban out of moral 
conviction.  
The first signs of an NSAG perceiving itself as a humanitarian actor can be found in 
the way it treats the civilian population on the ground. For the SPLM/A contradictory 
statements can be made. On the one hand, the movement acknowledged human rights 
and the Geneva Conventions at a very early stage. For instance, as early as 1983 the 
SPLM/A adopted a code of behavior that forbade certain forms of violence against 
civilians such as murder, rape, robbery and theft. The Ground Rules, the SPLM/A agreed 
upon within the framework of the Operation Lifeline Sudan23, also contain both a 
 
22 In 1996 by order of the Clinton government military equipment with a value of 20 million Dollars was 
imported into Southern Sudan via Eritrea and Uganda (Adar 1998; Sjöberg 2009: 42). The US government 
also supported the SPLM/A financially at the end of the 1990s by channeling money to the NSAG via 
humanitarian organizations (Riehl 2001: 10). 
23 Operation Lifeline Sudan was initiated in 1989 as a consortium of 40 NGOs under the leadership of 
UNICEF. Its goals was to coordinate the various aid deliveries and to guarantee better protection of the 
civilian population. When, after the murder of three aid workers at the end of 1992; pressure on the parties 
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reference to the Geneva Conventions and its supplementary protocols as well as to the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Children. In addition, the SPLM/A commits itself to respect 
fundamental human rights in the regions under its control (Bradbury et al. 2000). From 
the mid-1990s commitments to human rights are found more and more frequently in 
position papers of the SPLM/A. SPLM/A Commanders emphasize at different occasions 
that atrocities against civilians must be brought to an end (Rolandsen 2005: 114). 
However, this commitment to humanitarian principles was only implemented in 
practice in a very arbitrary manner. From the beginning of the war the SPLM/A was 
accused of a large number of human rights violations (African Rights 1994: 82). Although 
in part an improvement in the protection of human rights was observed (see Rolandsen 
2005; Barbelet 2008), rumors of the exploitation of civilians persisted (Riehl 2001: 7). As a 
result, it is difficult to establish whether the SPLM/A really took to heart the protection of 
civilians from a certain point in time or whether such rhetoric merely served as an 
instrument for garnering greater legitimacy. Barbelet therefore concludes: “The SPLM/A’s 
position regarding humanitarianism and human rights norms seems therefore to be both 
one of pragmatism and one of genuine concern” (Barbelet 2008: 266).  
In spite of these contradictory statements about the human rights tradition of the 
SPLM/A, a belief in the legitimacy of the norm clearly seems to have played a role in 
signing the DoC. The following indicators support this view. On the one hand, it is 
difficult to explain the proactive attitude of the SPLM/A in disseminate the norm without 
taking in account their belief in the legitimacy of the norm. The SPLM/A was the first 
signatory to the Deed of Commitment and was thus a pioneer. In addition, in the process 
of norm acceptance it supported stronger regulations in the implementation of the ban on 
mines and sought to convince other NSAGs of the negative consequences of the use of 
mines (Interview #1). Over and above this, in 1996 a year before passage of the Ottawa 
Treaty the SPLM/A had already published a unilateral declaration on the negative 
consequences of the deployment of mines (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, an analysis of 
public statements of the SPLM/A at the signing of the DoC implies that humanitarian 
issues played a role in their becoming signatories. For instance, Aleu emphasized in 2003: 
“The SPLM/A commitment to ban AP mines is not donor driven. Its only motivation is 
concern for the lives of the people that the SPLM/A wants to liberate and concern for the 
land” (Geneva Call 2003: 21) and Lino observes: “It is our conscience which dictates us, not 
international pressure” (Geneva Call 2003: 54). John Garang too emphasized that the 
SPLM/A renounced the use of anti-personnel mines because they were concerned about the 
suffering of the Sudanese population (Geneva Call 2003: 4). That from a certain time point 
the SPLM/A genuinely believed in the intrinsic quality of the norm is also suggested by a 
letter which Lino wrote in the name of the SPLM/A on the occasion of a mine workshop in 
Columbia. In this, the SPLM/A appeals to its “brothers” of the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) to do without APMs in their struggle. In the letter he states that mines do not kill 
politicians but civilians, and are the “ordinary person’s nuclear weapons and thus are 
 
to the conflict increased, they consented to agree upon basic principles for working with OLS. The ground 
rules are the first attempt by a humanitarian organization to guarantee the integrity of their aid and the 
protection of civilians during a conflict (Bradbury et al. 2000). 
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weapons of mass destruction”. Their use is “a crime against humanity” according to Lino’s 
straightforward words (Lino 2004).24  
Thus, according to this, significant people within the movement clearly had genuine 
humanitarian concerns. This assumption is shared by experts (Interviews #1 and 2). In an 
interview, Bongard emphasized:  
“I think we cannot rule out the fact that there was a general humanitarian sense behind. [...] 
I am not naïve that it is only this factor [...] but I would be very reluctant to say it was just 
for financial reasons or image that they made this commitment. I would say it is more 
complex than [...] to reduce their motivation to just financial gains and image or legitimacy 
compared to no humanitarian sense – I would not go so far to say” (Interview #1).  
According to this view, the SPLM/A leadership definitely saw itself as a humanitarian 
actor, which was fighting for the good of the Sudanese population. From a certain point in 
time, this self-image could no longer be reconciled with the use of anti-personnel mines, 
and thus brought at least parts of the SPLM/A into an identity crisis.25 Consequently, the 
SPLM/A recognized that anti-personnel mines harm in the first instance the local 
population, and the use of this weapon thus contradicts the goal of the struggle – the 
liberation of Southern Sudan (Interview #4). In this, Aleu and Lino had a decisive 
function first and foremost within the NSAG. Vis-à-vis the rest of the movement these 
two acted as norm entrepreneurs and directed the attention of the SPLM/A leadership to 
the negative consequences of the deployment of mines. 
It can thus be concluded that although humanitarian considerations were not the only 
reason for the renunciation of mines by the SPLM/A, they definitely played an important 
role in accepting the norm. They could explain above all – in contrast to the first two 
factors – why the SPLM/A, after deciding to sign the DoC, not only applied the norm 
unilaterally but also propagated the norm proactively. 
5.4 Internal and external need for legitimation 
The fifth assumption is that NSAGs will accept a norm because violating the norm would 
have certain social costs for them such as reduced credibility or loss of trust and 
reputation. This assumption will be investigated in the following section.  
As has already been mentioned, NSAGs with a clear political agenda have a heightened 
need for legitimation, because to reach their goals they depend upon internal and 
international recognition. In its struggle the SPLM/A was pursuing clear political goals: 
The use of violence had the purpose of changing the status quo, that is to say the political 
and legal basis of the society (see Bruderlein 2000: 11). In addition, it was entirely aware of 
 
24 Since this letter was neither published or distributed by the SPLM/A itself nor attracted attention in the 
media or among the international audience, it is very unlikely that it was intended for purely PR purposes. 
Linos appeal to the ELN can thus be seen as a strong sign that the SPLM/A really did believe in the 
intrinsic quality of the norm. 
25 What event led to this identity crisis in the case of the SPLM/A cannot be determined exactly. Capie points 
out, however, that for instance the presentation of new information on long-term consequences of 
landmines can lead to actors changing their preferences (Capie 2004: 88). 
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the expectations placed on it. The SPLM/A representative Nhial Deng Nhial emphasized 
this at the signing of the DoC: “The SPLM/A is fully conscious of the fact that although it 
is a non-state actor, the world has come to expect from it humanitarian standards, 
approaching if not on a par with those expected of sovereign governments” 
(SPLM/A 2001). 
In addition, the need of an NSAG for legitimacy depends on whether an NSAG is 
competing with the government and/or other non-state actors (Dudouet 2009: 16). This 
too was the case with the SPLM/A: On the one hand the aim was to alienate the 
population from the government. Rolandsen for instance points out that the SPLM/A 
placed the protection of civilians on their agenda to discourage them from fleeing into the 
garrison cities held by the government forces (2005: 114). On the other the SPLM/A was 
in competition with other non-state armed groups in the south for the support of the civil 
population. The large variety of ethnic groups in the south became a problem for the 
SPLM/A. Relationships with these in the regions occupied by the SPLM/A were 
complicated, especially after the split of the group in 1991. Riek Machar for example, the 
leader of the SPLM-United and a former SPLM/A commander, succeeded in 
instrumentalizing the supposed dominance of the Dinka within the SPLM/A, an ethnic 
group to which John Garang also belonged. In addition, the developments in 1991 
sharpened the awareness within the SPLM/A leadership of how important support in their 
own ranks is. The split was regarded by many as a “serious setback” which permanently 
affected the later development of the movement (Rolandsen 2005: 34). “[After 1991] 
SPLM/A leadership soon realised that they had to prove themselves worthy to those 
commanders and ordinary soldiers who had remained loyal to them” (Metelits 2004: 74). 
Thus, the SPLM/A stood under both internal and also external pressure to prove that it was 
the legitimate representative of the population of Southern Sudan.  
Competition with other NSAGs became less acute at the end of the 1990s,26 but at the 
same time the SPLM/A was gaining in power. Soon it regarded itself as having a genuine 
chance of really achieving its goal of bringing down the government. Some authors 
emphasize that an NSAG is more dependent on internal and international recognition 
when it finds itself closer to a military victory (Börzel/Risse 2009: 10; Jo 2009: 12). As has 
already been pointed out, from the mid-1990s the SPLM/A was again achieving military 
successes. At least in terms of territorial gains it was slowly getting the upper hand in the 
course of the war. However, no end to the conflict was in sight. Through the income from 
crude oil production the government in Khartoum succeeded in keeping the war going. 
They oriented their strategy to the purchase of expensive and high quality military 
equipment in order to prepare a major offensive (Rolandsen 2005: 125). The peace 
negotiations between the two parties to the conflict, which had already been in progress 
since 1989, only achieved a breakthrough in 2002 with a ceasefire agreement in the Nuba 
Mountains – one year after the SPLM/A signed the Deed of Commitment.  
 
26  In 1995 the SPLM/A succeeded in intensifying the cooperation, which had existed since the beginning of 
the 1990s, with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an alliance of opposition parties from the north. 
At the same time rival armed groups in the south lost credibility: Both Akol as well as Machar signed 
peace treaties with the regime in Khartoum and received positions in Al-Bashir’s cabinet. 
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Nonetheless, the “shadow of future statehood” postulated by Börzel and Risse seemed 
to apply to the SPLM/A. Accordingly, it was of less significance for the Sudanese NSAG 
that an end to the conflict could be achieved in the foreseeable future than that they 
judged the assumption of power to be realizable at all – even if in the distant future. 
Rolandsen demonstrates clearly in his book “Guerrilla Political Changes in the Southern 
Sudan during the 1990s” that internal and international legitimacy had already played a 
role for the SPLM/A since 1991 (Rolandsen 2005). Barbelet too reported that the SPLM/A 
was concerned about its reputation and consequently sought to build up a positive image 
both outside as well as inside Sudan. “In actively showing that the group was taking care of 
its constituency, the SPLM/A could aspire to greater legitimacy and recognition in the eyes 
of the international community” (Barbelet 2008: 318).  
For the SPLM/A, however, its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community 
through the signing of the DoC seemed to be of greater significance than its acceptance by 
the Sudanese population. This is emphasized in particular by the Sudan expert Moszinsky, 
who showed that the norm acceptance was intended to satisfy external supporters, 
whereas inside Sudan the signing of the DoC met with very limited interest (Interview 
#2). Rolandsen too argues that the new interest of the SPLM/A in the welfare of the local 
populace resulted in the first instance from the necessity of improving its own image 
especially among Sudanese exiles, foreign NGOs and Western governments, which called 
upon the SPLM/A to observe human rights (2005: 62, 115).  
It can thus be concluded that the DoC was also a welcome instrument for the Sudanese 
NSAG to make its commitment known at the international level (Interview #2). The fact 
that the Sudanese government had not yet signed the Ottawa Treaty also played a role for 
the SPLM/A which was thus able to lay claim to being better, that is more responsible than 
its opponent (Interview #4). According to this, it was important for the SPLM/A to prove 
that it observed international norms and was capable of assuming responsibility for the 
Sudanese people as a state actor after the end of the war. Thus, Bongard observed:  
“Of course they were hoping [for] some political gains, because they could appear as a 
movement that is abiding by international law, that would enhance their reputation, as a 
movement that is sensitive to international human rights standard and so forth” (Interview 
#1).  
It can thus be concluded that the wish for international recognition played an important 
role in the decision to sign the DoC.  
5.5 Transnational pressure  
A further postulate that is closely linked with an NSAG’s need for legitimacy is that the 
norm acceptance by the SPLM/A is significantly affected by the intensity and consistency 
of transnational pressure. The success of public censure also depends upon the material 
and moral vulnerability of the actor (i.e., upon for instance its financial dependency or its 
need for legitimacy), but both international as well as internal pressure are decisive for the 
acceptance and application of a norm (Risse et al. 2002: 12). In explaining the norm 
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acceptance of the SPLM/A the time period before the signing of the DoC is of particular 
interest.  
In the mid-1990s the interest of both locally active NGOs as well as the UN in norm 
violations by the SPLM/A was growing. In Sudan, in addition to international 
humanitarian aid organizations, so-called SINGOs (Sudanese Indigenous NGOs) were 
also active, and these had an independent political agenda. The large number of NGOs in 
Sudan led Riehl in 2001 to label the south of the country the first “NGO-istan” (Riehl 
2001). The SPLM/A was trying to exercise strict control over supposedly independent 
sources of information (Grävingholt et al. 2007: 74). But, despite this, information about 
the use of mines by the SPLM/A became public. As early as 1995, a women’s rights 
conference organized in Nairobi by the Kenyan Coalition to Ban Landmines at which 
Sudanese activists were present had been used as a platform to denounce the use of anti-
personnel mines by the SPLM/A (Geneva Call 2004: 13). The Kenyan Coalition to Ban 
Landmines also played an important role in shaming the SPLM/A in the following period 
(Interview #1).  
In addition, at the end of the 1990s two detailed reports were published at the same 
time which focused on the landmine problem in Southern Sudan and strongly criticized 
the use of mines by the SPLM/A (Landmine Monitor 1999). In August 1997 the Mine 
Clearance and Policy Unit of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs published an 
evaluation report on the landmine situation in Sudan, in which both the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM/A were identified as mine users. A year later, in August 1998 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) published its report “Sudan: Global Trade, Local Conflict” 
in which the SPLM/A was directly called upon to respect the provisions of the Ottawa 
Convention and to desist from the use of anti-personnel mines (Human Rights Watch 
1998: 5). In the summer of 1999 a second field mission was carried out by Human Rights 
Watch in Southern Sudan. Mines were also a subject of discussion in a meeting between 
the SPLM/A and the special representative of the UN at the end of the 1990s. Over and 
above this at the end of 2000, the IGAD Forum Task Force carried out an evaluation of the 
landmine situation in Sudan, in which attention was drawn to the continuing use of anti-
personnel mines by the SPLM/A (Landmine Monitor 2001). However, the SPLM/A 
declared that it only used mines laid by the government and reused these in a different 
place. The norm violation by the SPLM/A however was subsequently taken up by internal 
and international NGOs as well as publicly condemned, and continued use of anti-
personnel mines denounced.  
In addition to external actors such as the Kenyan Coalition or the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) internal civil society groups also influenced the norm 
acceptance of the SPLM/A substantially.  
“Especially women organizations and churches in Southern Sudan were very instrumental 
in putting pressure, in saying 'Why do you use this weapon, when it is affecting us more 
than the enemy?' And as the SPLM/A was depending quite a lot on the local population […] 
they were quite receptive or sensitive to this pressure from the constituencies or the social 
bases of the SPLM/A” (Interview #1).  
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Contrary to the assumption that the mobilization of internal opposition is strongly 
suppressed in conflict regions (Jo 2009: 14), it can be seen that in the case of Sudan 
organizations existed inside the country which criticized the SPLM/A. Thus, it can be 
concluded that national and transnational pressure played an important role in the 
decision of the SPLM/A to accept the norm. In Bongard’s words: “This issue, the pressure 
from their own constituencies […] and pressure from external actors was very important 
[in their decision to sign the DoC]” (Interview #1). 
5.6 Costs of an eventual assumption of power 
In addition to the explanatory factors introduced earlier, through the analysis an 
additional reason for the acceptance of the norm could be identified. The decision of the 
SPLM/A to sign the Deed of Commitment was also substantially influenced by the fact 
that support for the demining of the area was expected. As has already been mentioned, 
the entire south of the country was contaminated with mines (Barbelet 2008: 338). The 
mine clearance of such a large territory – at this time the SPLM/A controlled a territory 
the size of France – demands both time and resources, and the use of inadequately trained 
personnel can cost human lives (ICRC 1997: 21). Prior to the signing of the DoC however, 
many humanitarian organizations refused to support the Sudanese NGO Operation Save 
Innocent Lives (OSIL) financially and technically because of concerns that the area would 
be remined. The official signing of the Deed of Commitment by the SPLM/A thus served 
for many organizations as a guarantee that demining of the region would be worthwhile. 
The signing of the DoC is thus by no means a classical package deal, because Geneva Call 
could not support the NSAG itself due to its lacking such resources. Nonetheless, the 
signing established contact with the relevant organizations and in this way made possible 
financial and technical support.  
The promised support with the demining of the region cannot, however, serve as an 
independent explanatory factor for the norm acceptance, but is itself in need of 
explanation: The plan of the SPLM/A to demine the territory under its control is a part of 
the norm acceptance and not a cause of it. Instead, this factor too can be traced back to the 
political motives of the NSAG and their “shadow of future statehood”. The goal of the 
SPLM/A's struggle was not destruction of the regions but taking over the power in 
Southern Sudan. While signing the DoC the SPLM/A emphasized: “Our decision was 
triggered by the simple fact that we are fighting for a peaceful homeland and not a 
turbulent mine-land” (SPLM/A 2001). 
Consequently, at the end of the 1990s the SPLM/A leadership discovered that APMs 
will still constitute a burden for the population long after the end of the war and will make 
the development and reconstruction of the country more difficult (Lino 2004).27 
According to Bongard these considerations played an important role in the signing of the 
DoC: 
 
27 Landmines not only damage access to infrastructure and thus delay reconstruction substantially. Mined 
regions also inhibit in the long term for instance the return of war refugees, and thus additionally damage 
the social and economic structures of the regions (ICRC 2007). 
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“They were not in a mood of war. It was more a mood of ‘okay, what next?’ and next could 
come very quickly […] It was time for them to think about the time after the war, about the 
burden this weapon was causing and how it will still be affecting the people, even after war. 
I think there were these really important considerations” (Interview #1). 
The “shadow of future statehood” postulated by Börzel and Risse thus influences the 
behavior of an NSAG not only because it needs international and internal legitimacy. It 
also influences the decision because perception of its own identity as a future state actor 
gives the NSAG a keener eye for material costs that the assumption of power will entail. 
The capacity of an NSAG is often too limited to be able to bear these costs alone. At the 
same time, after the end of the war an NSAG often has to prove that it is better able to 
govern the population in the controlled regions than the defeated government. The 
analysis showed that such considerations played an important role for the SPLM/A. For 
instance, Nhial emphasized that the expectations of the international community after the 
end of the war constitute a “daunting challenge and a tremendous burden” for an NSAG 
which it cannot meet without stronger support from international organizations (SPLM/A 
2001). The SPLM/A thus realized that there is no sense in gaining control of a mined 
territory, when this, after the end of the war, generates more costs than benefits (see 
Geneva Call 2006: 12). The prospect of an end to the war and the takeover of power in the 
state in question also affect the long-term cost-benefit analysis of the NSAG and can thus 
contribute to norm acceptance. 
6. Lessons learnt 
6.1 Reasons for the norm acceptance in comparison  
As shown above, no single factor can explain the norm acceptance by an NSAG alone. 
Instead, the signing of the declaration of renunciation can be attributed to a combination 
of factors, each of which has a certain explanatory power.  
Contrary to initial expectations, the material vulnerability of the SPLM/A, i.e., its 
financial dependence on external support, played no role in the decision to sign the Deed 
of Commitment. Instead, the analysis showed that the strategic value of mines actually fell 
at the end of the 1990s. A lower strategic value of AP mines for the SPLM/A was 
incorporated into the decision to sign the DoC. This founding is consistent with the 
rational argument that norm acceptance is probable when its benefits exceed its costs. The 
reduced use of AP mines can however only explain the SPLM/A’s renunciation of anti-
personnel mines, but not its proactive behavior. 
The speculation that pressure from both the international community and also the 
Sudanese population contributed to norm acceptance was confirmed. Not only criticized 
its own supporters any norm violations, but also the local population on the ground, 
which has to bear the consequences of the armed struggle, the armed opponent, 
international and national humanitarian organizations, and third states which observe the 
progress of the war. The deployment of AP mines by the SPLM/A was openly discussed 
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quite early, and condemned. These strategies of shaming stood in a direct relationship 
with the signing of the DoC.  
As implied, there are different reasons why transnational pressure influences norm 
acceptance by an NSAG. On the one hand, it is possible that a censured NSAG suffers 
material losses from a loss of reputation. On the other hand, a sinking reputation can 
also incur social costs such as reduced bargaining power or distrust. Which reading 
provides the better explanation varies from case to case.  
In the case of the SPLM/A, the NSAG was vulnerable to transnational pressure 
mainly due to the fact that the so-called “shadow of future statehood” set in. The 
SPLM/A began to speculate about taking over power and was thus dependent upon the 
recognition of the international community and the internal population. The SPLM/A’s 
need for internal and international legitimacy contributed substantially to the decision 
to sign the DoC. Since it was pursuing political goals from the very beginning and was 
fighting for the self-determination of the Sudanese population it was dependent on good 
reputation and credibility. “The WAR could be fought with Kalashnikovs, but a future 
peace had to be won in a different manner” (Rolandsen 2005: 129, emphasize in 
original).28  
Beyond that, an additional explanatory point was identified above, which is closely 
linked to the ones described here. The analysis showed that the prospects of future 
statehood have not only an influence on the need for legitimacy of an NSAG. It has also 
the consequence that a potential assumption of power brings costs with it that cannot be 
borne by the NSAG alone. After assuming power, NSAGs often depend on the support of 
external actors. In the case studied here, the SPLM/A anticipated gaining support with the 
demining of the areas it controlled as a result of signing the DoC. 
However, the self-image of the NSAG also played a role in the norm acceptance. As 
shown above the SPLM/A also accepted the norm because it saw itself as a humanitarian 
actor which was fighting for the interests of the Sudanese population. It could not be 
definitively determined whether the SPLM/A was completely convinced of the intrinsic 
quality of the norm or whether only the two former SPLM/A commanders, Aleu and Lino, 
believed in the legitimacy of the norm. However it could be established that humanitarian 
considerations played in particular a role in explaining the pro-active engagement of the 
SPLM/A. Thus, NSAGs can clearly behave on the basis of humanitarian concerns. This 
assumption is also shared by Carstairs, who emphasizes:  
“Some armed non state actors have perhaps by now learned that the widespread use of 
landmines, in particular those that are particularly indiscriminate and uncontrollable […] 
runs counter to their stated purpose, for example liberation.” (Interview #4) 
The deployment of anti-personnel mines can thus contradict the goals being pursued by 
an NSAG (“liberation”) and thrust it into an identity crisis.  
 
28 The assumption that NSAGs which are concerned about their image are more willing to maintain 
humanitarian standards is also confirmed by various NGOs (see Petrasek 1999: 16; Geneva Call 2007a: 19; 
ICRC 2007: 64). 
Binding Non-State Armed Groups to International Humanitarian Law 25
 
 
 
 
6.2 Practical implications 
The empirical evidence shows that this finding can help explain the behavior of non-state 
armed groups in other cases too. The militant wing of the African National Congress, for 
instance, had already committed itself to a ban on anti-personnel mines in 1980, long 
before the Ottawa Treaty declared the deployment of this weapon illegal – out of the 
conviction that above all civilians are the victims of their own mines, and these civilians 
have to be protected (Interview #1). The assumption that non-state armed groups, in 
contrast with states, have no interest in the security of civilians is thus incorrect. NSAGs 
cannot always be regarded as the “bad guys” of world politics. Instead, the arguments 
presented above allow some generalized findings which can facilitate understanding of 
non-state armed groups in the future. However, the analysis also showed that the decision 
against anti-personnel mines is not always inevitably a decision against the self-interest of 
an NSAG and in favor of humanity, as the quote from Jef Van Gerwen in the very 
beginning postulated. Instead, acceptance of a norm can be attributed both to rational as 
well as normative considerations.  
Interpretation of the results stated above suggests the view that the motives that 
underlie an NSAG’s struggle are decisive for its acceptance of norms. If an NSAG is 
fighting for the political self-determination of a population group, protection of the 
civilian population in the struggle is more probable. The goals of an NSAG influence both 
whether the NSAG is sensitive to transnational pressure, i.e., whether social incentives or 
sanctions are effective, as well as whether it can be convinced of the legitimacy of the 
norm. In analyzing an NSAG it is thus important to clarify the intentions of the NSAG 
(see Barbelet 2008: 307).  
Consequently, norm acceptance is more probable when an NSAG is pursuing 
political goals. However, individual explanatory factors could also be applied to armed 
groups with a different motivation. To be sure, it seems probable that politically 
motivated actors have a greater interest in their own reputation than actors who are 
pursuing economic goals. However, this does not necessarily mean that the latter 
group would have no interest in their reputation. In April 2010 even Somali pirates 
reported that they were concerned about their good name and that they were therefore 
preparing an image campaign (Die Welt 2010).29 In addition, an idealized distinction 
between economic and politically motivated actors cannot be maintained in practice: 
NSAGs often have multiple identities, which can also change with the time. It is thus 
likely that a large number of NSAGs value their reputation and are therefore 
particularly vulnerable to shaming strategies.  
The finding that transnational pressure from the international community 
influences the norm acceptance of non-state armed groups yields further important 
guidelines for working with NSAGs. External actors can achieve success in influencing 
NSAGs by placing the norm violation of an NSAG on the international agenda, and in 
this way exerting pressure on the NSAG in question. Inducing NSAGs to accept a norm 
 
29 However, the question if these assumptions can also be applied to economically motivated actors requires 
further research. 
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by influencing their cost-benefit calculations also seems promising. It is true that material 
vulnerability played no role in the norm acceptance in the case of the SPLM/A. However, 
directing attention beyond the SPLM/A shows that the (financial) support of internal 
and/or international partners can play a major role in both a positive as well as a negative 
sense.30 In such cases it can help to change the interests of an NSAG in such a way that the 
costs of using mines exceed their benefit. Both governments and international 
organizations and NGOs can exert significant influence on the cost and benefit for an 
NSAG by, for instance, imposing financial sanctions, or damaging a group’s reputation 
permanently (see Bruderlein 2000: 12). Consequently, there are various ways for the 
international community to exert influence on NSAGs.  
7. Conclusion: NSAGs between Inclusion and Demonization 
Civil society initiatives working towards acceptance and observation of international 
norms specifically by NSAGs were the focus of this report. As an example, the successful 
engagement of the NGO Geneva Call, which is taking on a pioneering role in 
strengthening the humanitarian responsibility of non-state armed groups was investigated. 
The starting point for the analysis was the observation that NSAGs in internal wars 
constitute a direct threat to human safety, operate as rule-breakers, and in this way impede 
peace- and state-building processes. The engagement of the Geneva NGO shows, however, 
that this peace-threatening potential can clearly be inhibited. “Consequently, it is 
important to be well aware of the negative roles of NSAGs […] without ignoring their 
potential for humanitarian actions” (Geneva Call 2007a: 38).  
Recommendations for practice can be developed from knowledge of the conditions 
under which integration of these actors proceeds successfully. Thus, the goal was to 
investigate why NSAGs voluntarily commit themselves to humanitarian norms, in the 
present case the ban on AP mines. The analysis showed that a number of factors played a 
role in the norm acceptance. Thus external actors have various possibilities for exerting 
influence. As was shown in the last chapters, it seems very promising to change the cost-
benefit calculation of the norm-violating NSAG in such a way that the costs of the norm 
violation exceed its benefit. This can be done by naming and shaming an NSAG and 
making it fear for its reputation; but it may also be reasonable to threaten an NSAG with 
withdrawal of (financial) support in the event of a further norm violation.31 Furthermore, 
the offer to support an NSAG in clearing mines in the area they control can decisively 
influence its renunciation of AP mines. The example of the SPLM/A also shows that an 
NSAG can also be convinced of the correctness of a norm through dialog.  
 
30 For instance, the Sri-Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have refused to date to sign the 
Deed of Commitment, despite the increased engagement of Geneva Call. This failure is attributable, 
among other things, to the fact that the LTTE has sympathizers in the Tamil communities in the north and 
the east of the country and has recourse to strong support in the Tamil diaspora (see Tiemann 2003). As 
long as these people accept the deployment of mines by the LTTE the LTTE has only limited need for 
legitimation and because of the financial support of the Tamils living overseas is invulnerable. 
31 Although this factor played no role with the SPLM/A, other studies have nonetheless drawn attention to 
the significance of this factor (see especially Bruderlein 2000). 
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These starting points are not just interesting for the banning of anti-personnel 
mines alone. In many regions of the world today, NSAGs constitute a direct threat to 
human safety. In 2009, according to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research (HIIK), internal conflicts in which at least one non-state armed group was 
involved constituted the great majority of violent conflicts.32 In such conflicts NSAGs can 
impede processes of peace- and state-building, and thus function as rule-breakers 
(Schneckener 2009: 8). The points just made show, however, that the peace-threatening 
potential of non-state armed groups can be contained in a way that is both effective and 
also satisfies the need for legitimacy. The work of the NGO Geneva Call is a good example 
of how NSAGs can be bound by humanitarian norms and better protection of civilians 
achieved – even in areas with fragile statehood. Governments, international organizations 
and NGOs should thus not squander the opportunity of integrating NSAGs into 
international law by demonizing and criminalizing them indiscriminately. Instead, it 
seems promising to keep communications channels open, in order to convince NSAGs 
of the necessity of maintaining civil rights standards. Neither the exclusion of these 
actors nor their demonization can bring an end to the suffering of the civilian population 
– on the contrary. The practice of some states of drawing up official “terror lists” on which 
certain NSAGs are listed as terrorist groups is thus counterproductive.33 The isolation of 
such groups weakens moderate influences within an NSAG and gives hardliners a boost. 
This can bring NSAGs to deny humanitarian actors access to the controlled territories and 
lead them to enter into a spiral of violence (Florquin/Decrey Warner 2008: 20).  
The above mentioned view is not only shared by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC 2008). The current United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, 
stated on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: “We must 
[...] focus more attention on compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state 
armed groups. Unpalatable as it may be for some States, engagement with such groups is 
critical” (UN 2009). Former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, emphasized that the 
promotion of international humanitarian law and human rights norms require dialogue 
with NSAGs, regardless of whether they are well organized groups with political goals or 
plundering warlords. He highlights: “The designation of certain non-State armed groups 
as terrorist organizations has had an adverse impact on opportunities for humanitarian 
negotiations“ (UN 2004: 13). And Elisabeth Decrey Warner, president of Geneva Call, 
emphasizes that it is the responsibility of the international community to seek dialogue 
with armed groups, if such can save innocent lives and open up the path to peace 
negotiations (Decery Warner 2008: 1).  
The work of Geneva Call also shows that negotiations with non-state armed groups do 
not necessarily have an effect on the (legal) status of an NSAG if the negotiations are 
carried out under guidelines of neutrality and impartiality. A possibility thus offers itself 
 
32 As in previous years too, with 273 internal and 92 international conflicts, more than three quarters of the 
conflicts observed took place within a state territory (HIIK 2009: 2). 
33 Thus, for example the branding of the Columbian FARC as a terror group resulted in strict restrictions on 
the work of humanitarian organizations in the conflict regions, and through this contributed to a 
worsening situation for the civilians locally (UN 2004: 13; see also Florquin/Decrey Warner 2008: 20). 
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for states of engaging NGOs to promote inclusion of non-state armed groups in a political 
order. In this way, they avoid giving recognition to NSAGs through their own engagement. 
The international community should, however, agree upon a coherent approach in 
working with NSAGs, to prevent manipulation of individual initiatives by them. In this 
context, it should be born in mind that in working with NSAGs not only active interaction 
can have an influence. Passive behavior, such as non-recognition of an NSAG by external 
actors, can also call forth certain reactions by them (see Grävingholt et al. 2007: 34).  
As it seems, there will be no patent recipe for working with NSAGs. The remarks 
presented above however show that for an effective integration of non-state actors into 
normative structures it is helpful to leave conventional policy paths. It seems more 
promising to seek new forms of governance also, or especially, in dealing with NSAGs. 
This is no easy task, to be sure. But in view of the suffering of thousands and thousands of 
civilians who are exposed to the violence of NSAGs every day, any approach with the goal 
of binding non-state armed groups to humanitarian norms deserves stronger attention. 
The engagement of Geneva Call is a solid proof of that. 
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Appendix 
 
Overview of interviews completed 
 
Interview #1: Expert interview with Pascal Bongard, Director of the Africa 
Department of Geneva Call, conducted in Geneva on December 1, 2009.  
 
Interview #2: Questionnaire completed by Peter Moszinsky, freelance journalist in 
South Sudan since 1990, December 17, 2009. 
 
Interview #3: Questionnaire completed by Melha Rout Biel, Sudan expert at the 
Institute of Political Science of Jena’s Friedrich-Schiller University, January 9, 2010. 
 
Interview #4: Questionnaire completed by Tim Carstairs, former employee of the 
Mine Action Group London, January 17, 2010. 
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